Emerging Internet of Thing (IoT) platforms provide a convenient solution for integrating heterogeneous IoT devices and deploying home automation applications. However, serious privacy threats arise as device data now flow out to the IoT platforms, which may be subject to various attacks. We observe two privacy-unfriendly practices in emerging home automation systems: first, the majority of data flowed to the platform are superfluous in the sense that they do not trigger any home automation; second, home owners currently have nearly zero control over their data.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the prosperity of Internet of Things (IoTs), smart systems (e.g., smart homes, factories, and hospitals) have become realistic and are expanding with an ever-increasing speed [1] . IoT Platforms, such as SmartThings, Wink, openHAB, allow smart home users to connect heterogeneous IoT devices (e.g., sensors, actuators, appliances) to a platform-provided hub and to install applications on the platform to create automatic interactions among devices, i.e., home automation.
As IoT device data flow to the platform, protecting user privacy becomes critical [2] , [3] . Existing work protects user privacy by resolving threats caused by malicios automation applications [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] or handling attacks that eavesdrop IoT device traffic [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] . Surprisingly, none investigates privacy protection at the platform architectural level, even though the platform receives huge amounts of data from An earlier version of this paper was submitted to USENIX Security on November 15th, 2018. This version contains some minor modifications based on that submission. smart homes and has full data access privileges. Indeed, it is baseless to assume the platform is secure and trustworthy. A platform could be compromised by both inside attackers [12] and remote attackers that exploit the vulnerabilities of its hub and cloud [13] . Compared to clouds that have suffered many notorious attacks, an IoT platform has a much larger attack surface involving not only its cloud but also the hub and user control interfaces (e.g., web and mobile app). Moreover, many IoT platforms share users' data with partners (e.g., advertisers) for the expansion of businesses [14] , [15] , [16] ; any improper protection may exfiltrate private data to third parties.
Our investigation of popular smart home platforms shows that these platforms are factually overprivileged to access realtime data streams from connected devices, although most of the data do not trigger any automation. This deviates the principle of "data minimisation" in European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [17] or "least privilege" in access control systems [18] . We also find that no capabilities are provided for users to control the leakage of private device data to the platform, failing to realize user-centric authorization. Therefore, our goals are to minimize the data sent to the platform and allow users to define customizable data flow control policies for individual privacy preferences.
Multiple challenges arise for attaining these goals. First, the data minimization should not adversely affect the functionality of home automation . We observe that the semantics of home automation apps can be represented as rules with each following a event-condition-action model and the state-ofart code analysis techniques [19] , [20] , [7] are proved to be effective in extracting rule semantics from apps. Our insight is that by finding the minimum data flows required by these rule semantics, we can properly generate and enforce data flow control policies without affecting home automation. For example, suppose a rule has a semantic "when a motion is detected, if the indoor temperature is higher than 79 • F , turn on the A/C". We can convert it into a data-minimization policy, such that if the indoor temperature is not higher than 79 • F , no data is sent to the platform; besides, if the A/C is already on (that is, the rule execution does not change anything), no data is sent even if the temperature is higher than 79 • F . Optionally, users can have the system fuzz the data, such that even if the policy execution determines that the temperature should be sent, a random value larger than 79 is reported.
Second, many platforms are closed systems that do not allow platform-level modifications and it is probably unrealistic to expect a platform to cooperate to enforce data minimization. Thus, how to enforce data-protection policies before data leave the home network is a challenge. Intuitively, one may propose to circumvent this challenge by building a new purely-local platform, such that no data have to flow out of a home; or, one can simply cut the network cable of a local gateway [21] and enforce most of the home automation locally. However, a large number of existing platforms have been deployed in homes and it might be infeasible to convince users to switch to another new platform they are not familiar with; moreover, a purely local platform means that a lot of highly desired Internet-based services (e.g., messaging, storage, and remote management) will be cut out. Therefore, how to enforce data protection on the existing platform architecture without sacrificing the values of Internet-based services imposes extra difficulties. We leverage multiple system-building ideas into our system, named PFIREWALL. First, we build PFIREWALL as a data mediator, which sits between IoT devices and the hub to transparently filter data based on privacy-protection policies. The advantage is that neither IoT devices nor the platform needs to be modified. Thus, another challenge is that the original communication between IoT devices and the hub is encrypted, which prevents PFIREWALL from understanding and then filtering data. We overcome this difficulty with a man-in-the-middle approach: the data mediator claims itself as a hub to pair with all the devices, and meanwhile it creates the same number of virtual devices to connect the hub.
Furthermore, we borrow the idea of a DMZ (demilitarized zone) when designing PFIREWALL. A DMZ exposes certain external-facing services (e.g., web) to the Internet, while the organization's local area network (LAN) is segregated by a firewall. This way, even a node in the DMZ is compromised, attackers need to bypass the firewall to reach the LAN. We propose to place the hub in a DMZ, and set up an extremely simple firewall between the DMZ and PFIREWALL: the external world cannot initiate connection to PFIREWALL, and any inbound traffic, unless it targets those virtual devices, should be discarded immediately by PFIREWALL.
We demonstrate the ideas by implementing PFIREWALL to work with two representative platforms: Samsung SmartThings and openHAB, which are of the most popular cloud-based and gateway-based IoT platforms, respectively. We evaluate PFIREWALL in two real-world deployments. The results suggest that PFIREWALL reduces the amount of data sent to the platform by 97% based on data-minimization policies. Our case study shows that the data reduction heavily impairs the attacker's ability to infer privacy-sensitive behaviors, e.g., bathroom usage and the arrival and departure time of home members. The user-specified policies provides extra finegrained data control to resolve personalized privacy preferences and concerns.
The contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
• We reveal the fact that most smart home platforms employ a simple trust-by-default model between home devices and the platforms, resulting in over-leakage of sensitive IoT device data. We find several channels through which the collected data could be revealed, demonstrating the severe privacy risks. Despite the clear need for user-centric data flow control, we find that most leading platforms do not have supports for this purpose.
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• We design an effective data flow control system to enhance user privacy in home automation. On one hand, dataminimization policies are automatically generated based on the installed automation apps, reporting minimally necessary data for app execution and obfuscating the reported data for further protection. On the other, users are offered capabilities to prioritize policies specified by themselves to customize data flow control for individual privacy preferences and concerns. • A man-in-the-middle style enforcement mechanism in closed-source smart home systems is designed. A proxy device mediates the communication between IoT devices and the hub, without modifying the devices or the hub. • We implement a proof-of-concept prototype to work with two platforms: SmartThings and openHAB. Through the evaluation in two real-world scenarios: a two-bedroom apartment and a public workplace, we demonstrate that our system significantly reduces the privacy risks due to data leakage and introduces negligible latency to home automation. A user study is conducted to learn users' attitude and capabilities towards defining privacy-protection policies with mobile interfaces.
II. BACKGROUND: SMART HOME PLATFORMS
Smart home platforms can be categorized into two types: cloud-based platforms (CBPs) and gateway/hub-based platforms (GBPs), according to whether the core framework of a platform is hosted in a remote cloud or a gateway/hub device located at home (as shown in Fig. 1 ); the two types are similar, otherwise. Note that the gateway running a core framework at home does not resolve the privacy leakage threats, as the gateway connects to the Internet and is under the full control of the platform administrator. Once the platform is compromised, the attacker gains equivalent capabilities of gaining user data. We choose a CBP-SmartThings, one of the most popular and full-fledged platforms, as an example to describe the key components in a smart home system.
• Hub. A CBP hub connects IoT devices through distinct short/medium-range wireless radios (ZigBee, Z-Wave, etc.). The hub plays a key role to ensure the interconnectivity and interoperability of heterogeneous IoT devices. A GBP also has a hub-like device 1 which not only connects IoT devices but also hosts the core framework (descrbied below). Note that the hub or gateway device, though physically located at home, is conceptually regarded as a part of the platform in terms of data privacy protection in that it is under the fully control of the platform administrator.
• Cloud. The backend cloud of a CBP hosts the core framework and provides cloud messaging, storage as well as any other necessary services for the platform to function. The cloud in a GBP is typically responsible for messaging and storage. The cloud messaging service facilitates some critical functionalities, such as notification, third-party application integration, remote monitoring and control. Many Internet-based services depend on the cloud. • Core Framework. The core framework runs major functionalities of a platform, including home automation. Take SmartThings as an example. It provides a sandboxed runtime environment for running device handlers and Smar-tApps. Device handlers are software wrappers of physical devices which abstract the physical devices (as a set of capabilities and handle the underlying protocol-specific communications between the core framework and the physical devices). They expose uniform interfaces for SmartApps to interact with devices. • Companion and Third-Party Apps. To provide a convenient user interface (UI) for users to manage their hubs, IoT devices and apps, a platform usually provides a smartphone companion app. For instance, in SmartThings companion app, users can install and configure a SmartApp. Current platforms also expose interfaces (mostly RESTful cloud APIs) to incorporate third-party services/applications (e.g., mobile apps, IFTTT [22] , webCoRE [23]).
Therefore, a smart home platform has a large attack surface involving the hub, cloud, core framework services, companion app, and APIs for third parties, let alone inside attacks. It is dangerous and unnecessary that users grant unlimited trust to it by allowing all the data to flow to the platform.
III. MOTIVATION AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we first reveal two facts we have observed, and then present the threat model.
A. Privacy Concerns about Platforms 1) Trust By Default: In smart home systems, the platforms are typically fully trusted. That said, after being installed, a platform gains the access privilege to all connected home devices technically by design and legally by claiming a terms and conditions or a privacy policy. To reduce development complexity and the time to market, most emerging platforms do not provide access control between home devices and their hubs to avoid accessing unnecessary data; instead, they simply collect all data streams reported by devices for further processing. We studied the privacy-related practices in popular smart home platforms and showed the details in Appendix A. In this section we use SmartThings as an exemplar to demonstrate.
Are home data flowing out of homes silently? To answer this question, we connected four types of ZigBee devices (a multipurpose sensor, a motion sensor, an arrival sensor and an outlet) and a Z-Wave sensor (Aeotec Multisensor 6) to a SmartThings hub and inserted log.debug code into the parse methods of device handlers which are used by the core framework to parse the received IoT payload and generate in-system events. In this way, we obtain all data received by the SmartThings cloud via its hub on the living logging interface [24] . We did not install any automation apps and did not operate any SmartThings-provided interfaces; we only interacted with the devices physically. We found that the platform cloud still kept receiving device attribute data (e.g., motion, switch, temperature, etc.) from the above devices, indicating that device data flow out via the hub even if they are not subscribed to or requested by any service.
This trust-by-default model introduces severe data leakage risks to smart homes since attackers may gain unauthorized access to home data by compromising the hub device, cloud infrastructure, or the companion app [25] . Vulnerabilities in IoT platforms and clouds have been demonstrated by recent works. For instance, Fernandes et al. [18] and Zuo et al. [26] respectively revealed that the abuse of OAuth tokens and cloud API tokens in mobile apps imposes significant security and privacy threats including unauthorized access to the platform. An inside attacker can also access all the data.
2) Limited User Capabilities: Users visibility and control helps mitigate risks. However, users have few capabilities and interfaces to inspect or control what their device sends to the Internet [25] . They only have a binary choice: whether or not to connect a device to the platform; once connected, the device keeps reporting data to the hub device continuously and opaquely.
B. Threat Model
We consider the platform may be exploited by attackers for accessing user private data and inferring user privacy-sensitive behaviors. Attacks that exploit the home IoT device hardware vulnerabilities, side channels, or home local networks to steal private data are out of the scope of this work. We assume the home automation apps are not malicious (note that how to detect and handle malicious automation apps is a separate problem and has been well studied, e.g. [7] , [20] , [22] ).
IV. PFIREWALL SYSTEM OVERVIEW
To mitigate data leakage, we propose to introduce access control before data leave the control of users. In this way, privacy-oriented metrics can be applied to provide the data exposure with certain privacy guarantees (i.e., data minimization in this paper) and end-user controls are also feasible to satisfy personal privacy preferences. However, it is challenging to attain these goals for the following reasons. First, the data filtering, if not carefully performed, may accidentally affect home automation. Thus, how to precisely analyze apps and convert them into privacy-protection policies correctly is a challenge (Section V-A). Most smart home platforms are closed-systems and do not allow platform-level modifications.
Moreover, the traffic between IoT devices and the hub is encrypted. How to perform the data filtering without modifying the device, hub, or platform framework is challenging (Section V-B). How to provide interfaces for non-expert users to define their own privacy-protection policies is non-trivial (Section V-A2).
For interoperability, the wireless protocols in IoT devices are mostly open-source standard ones such as ZigBee, Z-Wave, LAN, etc., which makes it possible to place a manin-the-middle device (named mediator) between IoT devices and the hub to intervene in the communication between them. On top of the mediator, it becomes possible to process the raw data flows before forwarding them to the hub. With this insight, we build PFIREWALL, a system that enforces carefully generated data flow control policies before data are reported to the backend platform for home automation. As shown in Fig. 2 , PFIREWALL comprises the following modules:
• Rule extractor extracts the home automation rules from rule creation interfaces, e.g., IoT apps, webpages, smartphone apps, etc. When rules are initially installed, the rule extractor obtains rule semantics and rule-device binding information. In appified IoT systems, the rule extractor comprises a code analysis component to extract rule semantics from apps and a configuration collection component to collect rule-device binding information. The rule semantics and rule-device bindings constitute the complete automation logic. • Policy Manager generates and manages data flow policies used for protecting IoT data. Policy generation, on one hand, interacts with the rule extractor to generate semantics-based data-minimization policies; on the other hand, it takes in user-specified policies from the user interfaces and formats them into executable-formatted policies. Conflict detection inspects if a user-specified policy conflicts with existing data-minimization policies and thus affects home automation; when conflicts are detected, it reports the conflict to the user for making decisions. Policy engine interprets and executes the above policies over the incoming raw data from IoT devices. • Data Flow Mediator is a proxy who mediates the communication between IoT devices and the hub. The mediator, on behalf of the hub, talks with IoT devices via devicedependent protocols (e.g., ZigBee, ZWave, WiFi, etc) and forwards the raw device data to the policy engine for processing. On the other hand, the mediator creates a virtual device instance to send the processed data to the hub, on behalf of each real device. All virtual device instances use a uniform communication protocol supported by the target platform (e.g., LAN in SmartThings [27] and MQTT in openHAB [28] ). Besides, the virtual devices receive device control commands from the hub, which will then be translated to protocol-specific commands and forwarded to the corresponding real device. The data mediation is not transparent to the platform and therefore the platform works exactly the same way.
V. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the detailed design and implementation of PFIREWALL. We choose Samsung's Smart-Things, one of the most mature and comprehensive smart [fetch1] (:type).(:subject).(:attribute * ) 5 [branch] (:operator1)->(:value) 6 run (:method)(:parameters)(:delay) 7 [else] (:method1)(:parameters1)(:delay1) satisfy (:operator)->(:value) 12 [fetch1] (:type).(:subject).(:attribute * ) 13 [branch] (:operator)->(:value) 14 run (:method)(:parameters) 15 [else] (:method1)(:parameters1) 16 }, ...] Listing 1: Context-aware policy format home platforms, as the underlying platform to describe the implementation of PFIREWALL. We first describe our policy generation and management for contextually controlling IoT data flows. Then, we present how we enforce policies in existing IoT systems by introducing a data flow mediator. To show the applicability of PFIREWALL, we also present how we integrate PFIREWALL with another platform, openHAB, by adapting the platform-specific components.
A. Data Flow Control Policies
1) Policy Definition and Execution:
Home automation is context-aware: a rule executes a command when it is triggered by an event and meanwhile the smart home is under the prescribed condition. Note that the event and condition are slightly different: an event describes a context change (e.g., the motion sensor's reading changes from "inactive" to "active", which indicating a motion is detected) while a condition indicates a collection of static statuses (e.g., the motion sensor's latest reading is "active"). To precisely filter raw IoT data flows for data minimization without interfering with the execution of automation rules, data flows need to be processed contextually. To this end, we define a context-aware policy format.
Formally, we define a data flow policy as P=(T, C), where T and C denote the TRIGGER and CHECK section in a policy as shown in Listing 1. TRIGGER defines the incoming event that triggers the execution of P and CHECK encapsulates a list of items, each of which indicates a constraint that must be satisfied for the policy to indeed perform actions. type indicates that the event is fired by a device or is a time change, etc; subject is to identify a specific IoT device (i.e., device ID); attribute specifies the attribute of a device (which may have multiple attributes) or the time-related feature (e.g., time of day, date, timer). type, subject and attribute are to check if an incoming data matches the event that triggers the policy in TRIGGER and are to query the smart home status for constraint checking in CHECK. operator and value denote a constraint that the incoming event or smart home status must satisfy for the policy context to be evaluated as true. A policy action defined in the run fields where method and parameters define how to process the raw data and delay controls the timing for reporting the processed data to the platform. Besides, there are three optional fields marked with "[]" that form an extended TRIGGER section or a CHECK item.
[fetch1] and [branch] evaluate an extra constraint on the fetched data; if true action defined in run is executed, and otherwise action in else will be executed instead.
Policies are executed by a policy engine. The policy engine listens to all the incoming raw data from the IoT devices and time-related information if registered. When receiving a new data item D (a.k.a. an event), the engine uses D to evaluate the maintained data flow policies one by one. Algorithm 1 shows the general workflow of how the engine evaluates and executes a policy P. Specifically, it first checks if D matches the type, subject, and attribute in TRIGGER, and then examines if the value of D satisfies the constraint specified by operator and value. If true, P is triggered and proceeds to execute. Then the engine evaluates all items specified in CHECK. Since the data required for evaluating the CHECK items are not newly captured events but the current smart home status (e.g., the device working status), the policy engine fetches the information indexed by type, subject and attribute from a database DB, which stores the latest attribute values of all connected devices and updates them when devices report any change. Only when constraints defined in all CHECK items are satisfied, the policy is finally evaluated and the actions defined in all run or else fields will be performed. During the above process, a policy terminates if there is any event mismatches or constraint violation. Besides, the policy engine also maintains another database DB * to keep record of the lastest reported data for each device attribute. 2) Policy Generation: PFIREWALL generates two types of policies: automation-based data-minimization policies (APs) and user-specified policies (UPs). To achieve data minimization, i.e., only report the minimum amount of data that are necessary for home automation, rules are extracted from installed automation apps and analyzed to find the minimum data flows for the rules to execute. UPs are generated from user interfaces and work with APs simultaneously, which is an important supplement to customize privacy preferences that cannot be learned from home automation. Fig. 3 : The policy derivation from an automation rule.
Automation Rule Extraction
Rule extraction is the first step for AP generation. Automation rules follow an event-condition-action model and are installed by installing IoT apps or selecting rule templates on web or mobile app interfaces. The rule extraction regarding both methods has been widely studied by state-of-art literature. Code analysis has been proved to be an effective way to extract rule semantics from IoT apps by state-of-art work. For example, by utilizing Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) analysis on smart apps, [29] identifies requested and used capabilities in SmartApps, [7] , [30] breaks down SmartApps and extracts rule information, [31] , [32] , [33] builds Deterministic Finite Automatons (DFAs) from SmartApps. Symbolic execution is a more powerful technique to analyze rule semantics from apps [19] , [20] . Text data crawling and natural language processing (NLP) are used for rule extraction from web pages and mobile apps [32] , [34] .
Rather than design another code analyzer, in this paper, we adapt the solution provided in [19] to implement our rule extractor since it not only implements a complete symbolic executor with API modeling but also provides an app-device binding collection approach. We obtain the source code from the authors and verify its effectiveness on 86 SmartApps from SmartThings market apps. The executor works on the AST representation of a SmartApp; the rule extraction starts from an event subscription method subscribe() (event that triggers a rule) and traces in the entry point of the event handler method. All paths branching at if-else statements (rule condition) are explored until a sink (rule action) is spotted; expressions (e.g., value assignment) and APIs (e.g., device access methods, device control commmands) along the paths are modelled 2 . The combination of control flow analysis and data flow analysis allow us to extract the rule context (event and condition) and command (action) from a SmartApp. The right column of Fig. 3 shows the extracted rule from a temperature control SmartApp that defines a rule R 1 "when a presence sensor ps 1 becomes present , if the reading of a temperature sensor ts 1 is higher than 86 • F , turn on the fan f 1 ".
Data-Minimization Policy Generation
Consider the example rule R 1 . By default, the platform continuously receives and stores data streams from devices (presence sensor, temperature sensor, fan). However, we observe that these data are not all required for executing R 1 in cases:
(1) The presence sensor ps 1 does not send any event;
(2) ps 1 sends a "not present" event;
(3) The indoor temperature measured by ts 1 is lower than 86 • F ; (4) The fan f 1 is "ON"; (5) ps 1 sends a "present" event and the last reported temperature by ts 1 is higher than 86 • F .
In cases (1)-(4), there is no need to report any data from ps 1 and ts 1 to the platform; in case (5), it is unnecessary to report temperature data since the temperature value stored in the platform database satisfies the rule condition checking; in no cases, the ON/OFF state of f 1 is useful for executing R 1 . From this example, we can conclude that only sporadic ones in the data streams of devices are required for home automation, which motivates us to encode highly-structured automation rules to data-minimization policies. An example of generating an AP from R 1 is shown in Figure 3 . The TRIGGER of AP is derived from the Event of R 1 and CHECK is derived from the Condition and Action of R 1 , respectively. According to the policy definition and execution algorithm presented in Section V-A1, the derived AP expresses multi-faceted information for PFIREWALL to process data: 1) Context: when and only when an incomming event of ps 1 is "present" and meanwhile the latest received reading of ts 1 is higher than 86 • F and the state of f 1 is not "ON", some data will be reported, and otherwise, the policy will be skipped and no data will be reported at all; 2) Event reporting: if the latest reported value of ps 1 is "present", use the diffKeep() method to process the current value for reporting, and otherwise, use keep(); 3) CHECK data reporting: if the latest reported value of ts 1 is higher than 86 • F , use the block() method to process the current value of ts 1 , and otherwise, use randomize(86, MAX); use block() to process the state data of f 1 . Table I shows a summary of all the methods used in the run and else fields. In the default setting, binary sensors such as the presence sensor reports binary values alternatively; thus, SmartThings only fires an event when observing a value change. Our data flow control breaks the alternate "present" and "not present" values in the data stream of ps 1 . Thus, when the platform receives "present" but finds the last value is also "present", it will not issue a "present" event in its framework and R 1 cannot be triggered. Hence, the derived AP uses diffKeep() rather than keep() to address this issue; diffKeep() reports "not present" followed by "present" with a time delay T , which ensures a "present" event is fired. It is worth mentioning that the selection of T is non-trivial to guarantee the normal execution of home automation because it allows time for the platform to update a received data to its database. Similarly, it is required that SmartThings have updated the temperature value (if necessary) in database before it issues a "present" event to R 1 ; otherwise, the app will fail the temperature condition check when triggered by the event 3 . The 3 We manually observed app execution while tuning T and found a value as small as 100 millisecond without causing failure in 1000 trials. block() discards data without sending it. randomize() randomizes the float-value attribute data (e.g., temperature).
In the example, the temperature is used to compare with a threshold (86 • F ), so a random value between 86 • F and the upper limit of a temperature M AX is sufficient for the condition checking. MAX/MIN denotes the upper and lower boundaries of a specific attribute (See Table II ). We obtain such information from SmartThings Capabilities Reference [35] . Besides, we present how PFIREWALL handles time/timerrelated automation in Appendix B.
User-Specified Policy Generation
We propose an interactive approach for users to specify data flow control policies. This is motivated by three reasons: 1) users have individual privacy preferences that cannot be derived from automation rules; for example, users might prioritize privacy rather than automation functionality for some device types during a time period or under certain situations; 2) the platform may integrate a third-party service but there is no rule extractor available to extract semantics from it; 3) users have rights to control the use of their data. In principle, UPs have higher priority than APs in controlling data.
We develop a mobile app for end-users to specify policies. As shown in Fig. 4(a) , information is displayed to help users understand what privacy issues each device and its data may imply. With the templates in Fig. 4(b) , users are able to configure whitelist, blacklist and conditional control policies during a specified time period or under certain contexts. Finally, UPs are encoded into the policy format in Listing 1 for execution. See Appendix E for the user survey we conducted to evaluate the policy templates.
3) Policy Conflicts:
A user is likely to define UPs which conflict with existing APs and hinder the automation since UPs are designed for overriding APs. Nevertheless, users need a warning that shows them what conflicts are imposed and which automation rules are affected. Therefore, an automated policy conflict detection is necessary. Two policies P 1 and P 2 conflict if the following requirements are satisfied: (1) P 1 and P 2 are triggered simultaneously; i.e., an event makes both constraints c 1 T and c 2 T (defined in TRIGGER fields of P 1 and P 2 , respectively) hold; (2) both policies are finally executed i.e., all the constraints c 1 i and c 2 i in the CHECK fields of both policies are evaluated true; (3) two policies define different actions (i.e., data processing methods, parameters, or delays) for the same data. Formally, let S(C) denote the set of all possible contexts that satisfy the set of constraints C, and O(a), E(a) denote the object (i.e., the controlled data) and effects of a certain action a (defined in both TRIGGER and CHECK fields). A conflict occurs when the formula holds.
We detect policy conflict for each newly submitted UP against all APs. To calculate the constraint overlapping in the first two formulas in Equation 1, we encode each constraint in a policy into a quantifier-free first-order formulas: Thus, the constraint overlapping is transformed into a constraint satisfaction problem which can be solved by a constraint programming (CP) solver. In our implementation, we use a JavaScript linear solver javascript-lp-solver [36] .
If the constraint satisfaction is solvable, two policies will be executed simultaneously. We then check whether the two policies perform different actions (by looking at the methods and parameters in run and else fields) on the same data flow; if so, the new UP conflict with an existing AP. The automation app which the AP was derived from would be affected and is displayed to users for making decisions.
B. Data Flow Mediation
To enforce data flow policies in a closed-source IoT system, we introduce a data flow mediator for relaying the communication between IoT devices and the hub, as shown in Fig. 5 . To this end, the mediator needs to (1) act as a hub to interact with IoT devices and (2) generate a virtual device to interact with the original hub on behalf of each real device.
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1) Connecting IoT Devices:
To play the role of a hub, the mediator needs to handle 3 major interactions with IoT devices: 1) devices join or leave the hub-leading network; 2) devices report attribute data to the hub; 3) the hub forwards commands from the platform to devices. The hub functionality is provided by many open-source platforms, e.g., openHAB [37] and Mozilla IoT [21] , which allow developers to add add-ons for integrating various IoT devices using different communication techniques. Until now, openHAB supports 275 bindings that have been tested to work with hundreds of commercial IoT devices and Mozilla IoT also have tested more than 100 mainstream devices. In our implementation, we adapt the source code of Mozilla IoT to realize connecting with ZigBee and Z-Wave devices since the two techniques are widely used by IoT devices; specifically, the mediator is built on a Raspberry Pi with a Digi XStick USB dongle (ZB mesh version) and an Aeotec Z-Stick (Gen5) to extend ZigBee and Z-Wave capabilities, respectively.
C. Connecting the Hub and Platform
To interact with a target platform on behalf of a real device, the mediator creates a virtual device which could: (1) talk with the hub with a communication technique supported by it, and (2) be identified as a compatible device by the platform framework. Most emerging platforms support various connectivity protocols for developers to build customized network devices; for example, SmartThings supports LANand cloud-based device integration [27] , openHAB supports Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol [38] , Mozilla IoT provides REST-based Web Things framekwork and APIs [39] , and Wink allows creating RESTful API devices [40] . This feature alleviates the workload for interfacing with a target platform. We implement the mediator to work with two representative platforms: SmartThings and openHAB. Due to page limit, we present the openHAB part in Appendix C1.
Interfacing with SmartThings
We choose LAN as the protocol for communicating with the SmartThings hub since PFIREWALL is designed to be segregated from a DMZ by a firewall; thus attackers cannot initiate any connection to PFIREWALL to obtain data. SmartThings provides a device handler (see Section II) for abstracting each supported device type; accordingly, we build a virtual device (VD) type for each device handler (DH) that originally supports ZigBee or Z-Wave devices, as shown in Fig. 6 . We develop a service manager SmartApp on SmartThings that uses SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol) to discover VD instances on the LAN. To be considered as different devices (SmartThings uses IP and port to uniquely identify a device), each VD instance is launched on a different port. After discovered a device, the service manager adds it as a child device. When a child device is added, SmartThings automatically selects a DH to abstract it according to the model property of the child device; thus, we make the model property of the VD instance, the child device the same as the name of the target DH that is used to represent the corresponding real device. After the initial connection, a VD instance on the mediator side interacts with a DH instance on the SmartThings with the UPnP (Universal Plug and Play) protocol, which uses SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) messages. Additionally, we adapting all DHs for ZigBee/Z-Wave devices available in SmartThings IDE. In each DH, we add a subscribe() function which accomplishes the SUBSCRIBE step for UPnP communication; when a DH is instantiated (which means a VD instance is created and a child device is added), it uses the IP and port to send a SUBSCRIBE SOAP message to the VD instance, providing its IP and port information. Moreover, we change the code in parse and command-related functions for receiving ZigBee/Z-Wave data and sending ZigBee/Z-Wave commands respectively, to code for receving and sending SOAP messages in each DH. Thus, the VD and DH instances become addressable to each other and realize a subscribe/publish based UPnP communication to report data and send commands.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Setup
We build two real-world testbeds for evaluating the performance of PFIREWALL: an office with 5 members (T 1 ) and a two-bedroom apartment with 1 member (T 2 ), as shown in Fig. 7 . In each testbed (T 1 and T 2 ), we deployed two parallel systems (SYS1 and SYS2) by placing two same devices at each position in Fig. 7 ; SYS1 and SYS2 have the same device types, numbers, placement and app configuration, as shown in Table III , Fig. 7 and Table IV . The only difference is that SYS1 is a standard SmartThings deployment but SYS2 introduces PFIREWALL. We bind SYS1 and SYS2 in each testbed to two different SmartThings accounts and run them simultaneously but independently. We choose SmartThings in the real-world testbeds because SmartThings provides official apps in its app store, while openHAB needs users to write automation apps and provides no market apps. Instead, we perform some microbenchmark tests for evaluating openHAB (see Appendix C2). 
B. Performance of Data Mediating
To test the correctness of PFIREWALL mediator, we disable the data filtering in SYS2 of both testbeds, i.e., the mediator simply forwards the IoT data to SmartThings without executing policies. To capture received data by SmartThings, we insert log.debug code into the parse methods in all device handlers for the tested devices, which allows us to record the event logs per device on SmartThings web IDE. We observe that there exist duplicate events in the captured SmartThings event logs, so we remove duplicates before analyses; consecutive events that have the same modality (the same device, attribute, value) and very close timestamps (not longer than 1 second) are regarded as the duplicates. We run the above setting in SYS2 of both testbeds for 10 days and compare the data sequence of each device received by PFIREWALL mediator and SmartThings. Table V shows the total numbers of received data per device and the number of inconsistencies in the data sequences. The result shows that our mediator works effectively and correctly in relaying the received data to the platform.
C. Performance of Policy System
To test the performance of our policy system, we establish a comparative experiment by running SYS1 and SYS2 simultaneously in both testbeds for another 10 days. We enable data filtering in SYS2, so SYS2 in this experiment runs the data-minimizaion policies. Also, we define two extra userspecified policies: UP1 (DO NOT report MO1.motion data between 5pm to 10pm) in T 1 and UP2 (DO NOT report MU2.contact data between 8am to 6pm) in T 1 .
1) Correctness and Reliability:
Comparing the received data sequences is meaningless since data are filtered in SYS2, so we test the correctness of the execution of SmartApps. To capture the execution of apps, we manually insert logging code into the installed SmartApps to record the method calls for controlling devices and sending notifications. We compare the method call sequences of each app in SYS1 and SYS2 and calculate the number of inconsistencies. We summarize the result in Table VI . We figure that the IN C values of some apps are large. This is because SmartThings apps do not check a device's current status before sending it a command and thus redundant method calls are made while PFIREWALL in design disables redundant automation commands to reduce reporting data. For instance, the app UEW calls the light turn-on method every time the door (MU1) is opened, no matter the light is "on" or "off"; however, the redundant method calls are avoided by our data flow policies if the light's status is already "on". Thus, inconsistencies are detected in some apps. To eliminate the impact of redundant automation on the evaluation of automation accuracy, we capture and remove the redundant method calls from method call sequences in SYS1 by analyzing app and device logs; specifically, if a method call's effect is to change a device to a state the device is already in, this method call is identified as redundant and removed from the sequence. We recalculate the inconsistencies, denoted as IN CA. As show in Table VI , IN CA in most apps are 0 except in four apps: MAC, MFN in T 1 and UEW in T 2 . We manually analyze the causes of these inconsistencies by examining the device event and method call logs. we find that the event log of SP1 in SYS2 has one more "present" than that of SYS1. This is because SmartThings detects presence by monitoring the distance of a smartphone (GPS data) from the in-home hub while PFIREWALL scans the home WiFi network to examine if a smartphone enters/leaves; when SP1 moves around, different presence statuses are detected by the two methods due to distinct detection ranges, leading to the inconsistency in MAC. The inconsistencies in MFN and UEW appear because user specified policies UP1 and UP2 block MO1.motion and MU2.contact data during certain periods, respectively. We verify that the 2 inconsistencies in MFN occur during 5pm-10pm and the 3 inconsistencies in UEW occur during 8am-6pm. We also observe that no MO1.motion or MU2.contact data are received by SmartThings in SYS2 during the specified periods in UP1 and UP2, respectively. The above result shows the correctness of our policy-based data flow control in enforcing user-specified policies and in preserving home automation functionalities by generating data-minimization policies.
2) Latency:
We show the efficiency of PFIREWALL by testing the introduced automation latency (mediating delay plus policy execution delay). We obtain the result by computing the timestamp difference of the same command in both command sequences (SYS1 and SYS2). We exclude the outliers from our calculation where the command in SYS1 is even issued after SYS2 to reduce the influence of network delay and the cloud response latency on the result. We calculate the automation latency for each SmartApp in both testbeds and show the result in Figure 8 . The automation latency ranges from 124.7 to 486.4 millisecond. An averaged latency of 210.6 millisecond is a tradeoff for using PFIREWALL to mitigate privacy leakage, although the latency is completely acceptable for most automation apps.
3) Reduction of Data Leakage:
To show the effectiveness of data filtering, we compare the data volume reported by each device in the SYS1 and SYS2 of both testbeds. As show in Table VII , PFIREWALL blocks 96.87% IoT data on averaged. More than 99% of float-value sensor readings and device states (i.e., ON/OFF states of coffee machines, setpoints of thermostats, locked/unlocked states of smart locks, etc.); thus, PFIREWALL prevents the smart home platforms and potential attackers from learning the private information of smart homes and homeowners based on float-value sensors and household appliances. PFIREWALL also reduces the reporting of binaryvalue sensor attributes (contact, motion, presence) to distinct extents, according to the specific automation app semantics and app-device bindings. The relative reduction rate RR of binary-value attributes are smaller than float-value attributes in general, since binary attributes are used for triggering the execution of automation apps in most cases and hence cannot be totally blocked.
4) Privacy Gain:
To show how privacy preservation is achieved by the reducing data leakage, we compare the potential privacy leakage under several inference attacks with and without PFIREWALL.
Office members and events profiling. By analyzing the presence sensor (SP1∼5) data in the research lab testbed (T 1 ), the working hours of 5 members (person 1∼5) each of whom carries a presence sensor could be learned, based on their entering and leaving time, as shown in Fig. 9(a) . In addition to monitoring user presence in real time, the attacker could also learn the personal working preferences and group events. For example, person 1 may leave for classes each Tuesday and Wednesday; person 3 works less hours than person 1 and 2 during weekdays but shows up more on weekends; person 4 has a more regular routine through the weekdays; person 5 works less hours (4 or so) every day and the hours tend to be in the afternoon; moreover, the members may leave for a group meeting on Friday morning. When PFIREWALL is deployed, most presence data are filtered since only the "present" events before 12am from SP1 are required to turn on coffee machine outlet (see app MAC). The presence sensor data of the other persons are never sent because their values are kept "not present" in the platform database and only "not present" events from SP1 are sent in order for the app LON to pass its condition checking. when the last person leaves. which hides the real leaving time of person 1.. Therefore, an attacker could only learn when person 1 arrives the lab room correctly (see Fig. 9(b) ).
Bathroom usage monitoring. By accessing the motion and humidity data of the Aeotec Multisensor (AM2) in the apartment testbed (T 2 ), an attacker can learn the bathroom usage habits. As depicted in Fig. 10(a) , the attacker simply combines each "active" with the next "inactive" event to obtain the start and end time of a bathroom usage. Moreover, the attacker can also use the humidity data (see Fig. 10(c) ) as additional information to help recognize "having shower" activities in the bathroom. In the experiment, the attacker identifies 4 "having shower" activities by comparing the humidity values with a common sense threshold (i.e., 85%). When PFIREWALL is applied, the humidity data is rarely sent (for executing the anomaly activity detection app NMW) and motion "active" (AM2) is reported only once to keep the motion value "active" in the platform database. As shown in Fig. 10(b) and 10(d) , the humidity and motion data are respectively sent only once in our one-week experiment, preventing the attacker from monitoring and learning the bathroom usage habits.
Appliance monitoring. Non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM) techniques can infer appliance events based on electricity data, causing privacy concerns [41] , [42] . We set up another experiment to learn how attackers are prevented from inferring appliance working status and user activities when power data are protected. We connect a microwave, a kettle and a stove to a smart outlet and install an automation app that turns off the outlet when a user leaves home to avoid fire accidents. Although the app only needs a presence sensor data to operate, the outlet also measures real time power data and reports it to outside. To study the incurred privacy risk, we collect the reported raw power data (see Fig. 11(a) ) for 3 days and perform inference attacks. The attack process includes data pre-processing, clustering and mapping ( Fig. 11(b)-11(d) ). The inference result achieves 95.7% precision and 92% recall in identifying appliance activities when compared with the manually collected ground truth. When PFIREWALL operates, all power data are preserved for running this app and hence no user privacy could be inferred from power data.
VII. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
Can PFIREWALL perform home automation and thus get rid of the cloud? Note that PFIREWALL has access to all device data and rule semantics from IoT apps. Theoretically, PFIREWALL is capable of running a rule engine to execute the extracted semantics; thus, no data is sent to the cloud at all. However, we did not employ this design due to practical considerations. (1) The kick-cloud-out strategy may cause ethical or legal concerns which our research team cannot tackle. The SmartThings cloud can easily verify whether it is talking with a real SmartThings hub, and cut all the services if not. It means that, while PFIREWALL may provide home automation, all other cloud-based services (messaging, storage, and remote management) will be lost. (2) Huge engineering efforts are needed to implement an equivalent rule engine that supports the same programming framework and APIs and maintain them in a long run. Therefore, we strategically segregate the data flow control policy engine and the rule engine; PFIREWALL only deals with data filtering.
User efforts. In PFIREWALL, users pair IoT devices with the mediator on PFIREWALL web interfaces and add the virtual device instances to SmartThings with its companion mobile app; thus, users operation for connecting devices is doubled. We design SmartThings-alike pairing interfaces on the PFIREWALL side, which makes pairing on both sides similar and reduces potential confusions. Moreover, we use the browser automation framework Selenium to develop a Python script, which periodically checks the new SmartApps and devices, and installs corresponding instrumented SmartApps (for rule extraction) and custom device handlers (for PFIREWALL mediation), respectively. Users only provide their SmartThings accounts to the script and no other operations are required.
Generality. Although our implementation targets SmartThings and openHAB, the presented approach can be potentially adapted to other ecosystems. As discussed in Section V-B, it is complete practical to realize a man-in-the-middle mediator in most systems. On one hand, the mediator could be extended to work with as various IoT devices as an opensource platform; on the other, the mediator could interfacing with many platforms via a connectivity technique provided by these platforms for creating and integrating software services and hardware devices as "things". Moreover, approaches for extracting automation rules from IoT apps [31] , [7] , [32] , [20] , [19] and mobile/web interfaces [32] , [34] , [43] have been broadly studied. We envision that tools are developed by the community for extracting rule semantics from more platforms such that the data-minimization policies can be generated.
VIII. RELATED WORK
A. Privacy in Smart Home Platforms
Besides security, privacy is also an important research topic in smart home ecosystems. Zheng et al. [2] studied smart home owners' perceptions of privacy risks and actions taken to protect their privacy; the study found that users are unaware of privacy risks from inference algorithms operating on data from their IoT devices, and they expect device manufacturers to protect their privacy though it is not the case. Celik et al.
[4] provided a tool for tracking the sensitive data flows in programming frameworks and identified 138 out of 230 apps in SmartThings transmit at least one kind of sensitive data over platform-provided APIs, which means malicious apps have the capability to steal user data collected by the platform. Literature [18] and [31] also present app-level attacks that can brench user privacy. Closest to our work, FlowFence [6] enforced a data flow control mechanism for sensitive data protection. However, FlowFence protects sensitive data from unauthorized apps rather than the platform, so sensitive data protection still fails to other attacks; FlowFence requires the cooperation from the platforms and app developers to operate.
B. In-hub Security and Privacy Enforcement
Many in-hub schemes are proposed to enforce security and privacy schemes in the IoT domain. Simpson et al. design a inhub security manager built atop the smart home hub to patch vulnerable IoT devices and strengthen authentication. The security manager is deployed in a open-source system HomeOS. FACT [44] and HanGuard [45] enforce access controls in the middle by implementing controllers on an open-source hub and a programmable WiFi router, respectively. By comparison, these schemes rely on a programmable hub (gateway, router) that can indeed intercept control the communication between home area network and the Internet. However, in cloudbased smart home platforms like SmartThings, communications between the commercial hub and the backend cloud are encrypted [46] and hence the router can neither decrypt nor modify the packets on demand. PFIREWALL controls the communication between IoT devices and the hub in a unified, backward-compatible way, regardless of the specific communication protocol employed by the hub and cloud.
IX. CONCLUSION
We presented PFIREWALL, a semantics-aware customizable data flow control system for smart homes, which filters data generated by IoT devices. PFIREWALL can automatically generate application-dependent policies based on installed automation apps to block unnecessary data flows and only report the minimum amount of data required for home automation. Furthermore, PFIREWALL allows users to customize individual policies according to their own privacy preferences.
We overcame many challenges and designed an elegant man-in-the-middle proxy based system, which enforces these policies without modifying the platform or IoT devices. We implemented a prototype of PFIREWALL and evaluated it in two real-world testbeds. The evaluation results demonstrated that PFIREWALL can effectively and efficiently reduce sensitive data leakage without interfering with home automation. It heavily impairs an attacker's ability to monitor and infer user privacy-sensitive behaviors. In addition to smart homes, the system can also significantly enhance privacy protection in many other environments, such as smart factories and offices, that leverage smart platforms for IoT device interaction automation and other platform-provided services.
B. Time/Timer-related Automation
PFIREWALL also deals with time-related automations. For instance, if a rule is defined as "when the door is opened if time is after 18:00, turn on TV", the derived policy needs to fetch system time for condition checking. When it comes to a timer-related automation, e.g., "when motion sensor becomes inactive for 5 minutes, turn off the light", multiple policies are bundled to operate by calling the methods for starting, stopping and firing a timer. Fig. 13 illustrates the workflow of how PFIREWALL handles this example.
C. Interfacing with openHAB 1) Implementation: We use the supported MQTT to interface with openHAB because it is a general connectivity protocol, allowing for virtualizing any device types with flexibility. Fig. 14 shows the high-level architecture of the integration. openHAB provides an embedded MQTT broker, so our work is to realize each virtual device (VD) as a MQTT client and create a Generic MQTT thing (supported by MQTT binding) in openHAB for the real device represented by the VD. A thing in openHAB has channels (equivalent to the concept "attribute" in SmartThings, e.g., motion, temperature, etc.) and each channel can be linked to an item (used for displaying values received by the linked channel and used as an interface for automation rules to interact with the real device). In openHAB, Table IX . action1 is defined to report "inactive" to the platform with method keep and zero delay. Each timer maintains a list of actions which will be called when the timer's duration satisfies a certain constraint.
each MQTT thing channel can be configured as a MQTT client. By subscribing to the same MQTT topic (essentially a path-alike string), MQTT clients can publish/receive data to/from the topic.
When a new device is added to PFIREWALL, a VD instance is created. If the real device is a sensor (e.g., Stop and reset a timer with identity id fireTimer(id)
Fire a timer id and execute actions in its callbacks addCallback(id,act) Add an action act to the callbacks of timer id motion sensor in Fig. 14) , the VD instance subscribes to a topic data/{device id}/{attribute} (e.g., data/12345/motion) for publishing data, where device id is generated randomly by PFIREWALL; if the real device is an actuator (e.g., smart outlet), the VD instance subscribes to a topic data/{device id}/{attribute} for publishing data and a topic cmd/{device id}/{attribute} for receiving commands. The MQTT bining in openHAB does not provide a device discovery function. To automatically add a thing and its channel in openHab, there are two choices: operating on the web interfaces or adding a configuration file in the openhab/conf/things/ directory. We choose the latter approach to automate the process. By populating a string template with the same device id, attribute and topic information as the VD instance, PFIREWALL creates a MQTT thing by adding a thing file to the openHAB directory through a FTP service. Thus, the created MQTT thing can receive data from or send commands to the VD by subscribing to the same topics.
2) Evaluation: openHAB allows users to write automation apps with a domain specific language (DSL), which is adapted from Xbase [47] . However, openHAB does not provide official apps for installation. To test our openHAB integration, we develop 13 apps implementing the same rule semantics to work with the same devices, as shown in Table IV . We manually operate the real devices to trigger each rule for 20 times and find all apps are executed correctly.
D. Complete Evaluation Result of Data Volume Reduction
Due to page limits, we only present the result of one device for each device type in Table VII in Section VI-C3.  Table X shows the complete list of all deployed devices in both testbeds.
E. User Study
1) Setup:
We conduct a user survey to study users' attitude and abilities towards defining customized data flow control policies with our policy templates (Section V-A2). We recruit 20 adult participants who are knowledgeable about the concepts "home automation", "smart home" or "IoT" from our institutions. Participants completed the trial tasks of our "PFirewall Survey" app in our lab using smartphones we provided and after that answered several questions (see Section E3).
We asked the participants to get familiar with a smart home setting where 10 automation rules ( Fig. 12(b) ) are configured to work with 15 devices (Fig. 12(a) ). The app provides a page ( Fig. 12(c) ) to illustrate the architecture of the system and the potential risks of data leakage; we did not explain the content and ask questions about this page to avoid influencing the understanding of end-users by factors other than the interface itself. Besides, the app also provides an interface showing the list of 15 devices; when a device is selected, the app switches to a device detail page (e.g., Fig. 12(d) ) showing what data the device generates and what privacy risks are imposed if the data are leaked. In addition, policy templates (as shown in Fig. 4(b) ) were provided for participants to define their own policies. After a 30-minute trial, participants were asked to answer questions.
2) Results: All 20 participants cared about their data privacy and thought it useful to define their own data flow policies for protecting privacy. However, 2 participants thought they would not spend time in defining policies even if an app is available. We collect the number of participants who had privacy concerns on each listed device. Cameras and smart speakers were the top two devices whose data are considered sensitive by the participants (19 and 16, respectively); half or more participants had concerns on the status data of smart locks, doors and windows (11, 13, 10, respectively); Each of humidity sensors, heaters, lights, powers and coffee makers is concerned by less than 3 participants. Except the listed devices, the participants also cared about the data privacy of smart TV, smart window blinds, smart outlet.
Regarding the usability of our policy templates, 8 participants thought the templates are "very easy" to use and 12 participants thought them "easy" to use. 3 participants found that they cannot specify policies to control data by specifying multiple conditions with the templates, for example, the combination of an event and a specified time period. According to the feedback, we address this issue by allowing users to select another condition after a condition has been specified.
Overall, participants concern data privacy and hold a positive attitude in defining own policies with our templates. The result also shows that participants may overlook the privacy risks of some devices like humidity sensor and powers, which we have discussed in Section VI-C4. Hence, data-minimization policies and user-specified policies could work together to achieve better privacy protection.
3) Questions in the user study:
1) Do you care about your data privacy if you use a smart home system?
A. Yes B. No 2) List the device(s) (from the given device list in our "PFirewall Survey" app) which you have privacy concerns if the device data are leaked. 3) Do you think it is useful in general to control your own data to reduce privacy leakage risks? A. Yes B. No 4) Would you spend time defining your own policies to control data if an app like "PFirewall Survey" is available for you to do so? A. Yes B. No 5) Recall how our app guide you to define your own policies.
Are the provided policy templates easy to understand and use? A. Easy B. Somewhat challenging but still able to use C. Not usable 6) Do you find any policy that you think useful but the given templates fail to enable you to do so? If any, please list it.
F. IRB Approval
Our testbeds need to collect data from the testbed providers, including the 5 office members and 1 apartment member. Also, our user study involves 20 participants. We have received the approval from the IRB in the institution where all the above investigations are performed.
We value the participant privacy during our investigation processes. The data collected from both testbeds do not contain personally identifiable information and location data. The collected data will be transmitted to and stored in the password protected computer of one of the authors. Computers that store data have password-protected accounts and will be in a locked office that has limited access. Only the researchers identified on this protocol will have access to the data. Survey participants are asked to submit their questionnaire anonymously without revealing any personally identifiable information. The questionnaire will be stored in the locked office after analyses.
